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STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: AN
EVALUATION OF THE TRADEMARK
REMEDY CLARIFICATION ACT’S
ATTEMPT TO SUBJECT STATES TO SUIT IN
FEDERAL COURT FOR TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENTS UNDER THE LANHAM
ACT
JENNIFER L. FESSLER, ESQ.*
INTRODUCTION

States

and state institutions actively participate in the
trademark system, and maintain all the benefits of that system
while escaping the limitations. For example, state universities
hold rights to a massive amount of trademarks, and as such
they have all the rights of a trademark plaintiff but avoid the
liability of a trademark defendant. This means that a state can
aggressively protect its mark by bringing suits against those
who infringe it, while individual trademark owners cannot
bring suit against the state for the state’s infringing use. It is
easy to see the inequity present in this situation. Where is the
fairness in allowing one trademark owner to avoid financial
liability for its infringing actions, but not another? Where is
the justice in allowing states to vigorously bring suits against
others for infringements, but others cannot do the same when
the state infringes their mark? In New Star Lasers, Inc. v.
Regents of the University of California, the court
acknowledged the inequities present, and stated that it could
think of, “no other context in which a litigant may lawfully
enjoy all the benefits of a federal property or right, while
rejecting its limitations.” 1 This is the very issue that
* The author is an attorney and graduate of the Southern New
England School of Law (J.D.) and the Franklin Pierce Law Center
(L.L.M.)
1
New Star Lasers v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d
1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
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Congress set out to remedy in the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act (TRCA).2 The TRCA sought to place state
and individual trademark holders on equal footing by
abrogating state sovereign immunity, thereby subjecting
states to suit in federal court for violations of federal
trademark law, which is codified in the Lanham Act. This
legislative action was in response to the Supreme Court’s
announcement of the requirements Congress must meet
before it can validly abrogate state sovereign immunity.
However, like a metaphoric game of ping-pong, once
Congress passed the TRCA in an attempt to meet the Court’s
new requirements, the Court refined the requirements. Now,
the TRCA must be examined to determine if it can meet these
new requirements, or whether it will have to go back to the
drawing board. This is an important evaluation to make,
because if the TRCA fails to meet the requirements set forth
by the Court, then its attempt to abrogate state sovereign
immunity also fails, and the inequity remains.
In Section II, I address the first issue in this comment;
how this legal game of “ping-pong” between Congress and
the Supreme Court began. Prior to the ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment there were concerns that the states
would be subject to suit in federal court. Then, when the
Eleventh Amendment was ratified, those concerns were
alleviated, but new issues emerged. The ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment set the ball in motion, and so the game
between Congress and the Court began. At the outset, the
language of the Eleventh Amendment was very narrow, yet
the Court interpreted it broadly. This broad reading of the
Amendment gave states greater protection than the plain
language called for. As a result of this broad interpretation,
the balance between the competing interests of state and
federal government shifted in the states’ favor. After
providing the states with broad immunity, and setting the
balance of power into the states’ favor, the Court attempted to
alleviate the inequity it had established by carving out some
ways that a state could be subject to suit in federal court. One
2

Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C.,
§§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (2000)).
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of the ways the Court allowed states to be sued in federal
court was if Congress abrogated state immunity through
legislative action. It seems that ever since the Court gave
Congress this opportunity to abrogate state sovereign
immunity through legislation, it has done all it can to limit
this ability and shield the states from such suits. Therefore, it
appears that the Court and Congress are playing on opposite
sides of the table when it comes to states rights. While the
Court appears to be vigilantly fighting for broad protection of
states rights, Congress seems to be aggressively trying to
maintain some balance of power between individual and
states rights by enacting legislation that would abrogate state
immunity in appropriate circumstances.
Section III of this comment discusses the tensions
between the competing values of federalism and federally
protected individual rights that recent cases illustrate. When
Congress would create legislation with the intent to abrogate
state immunity, the Court responded by placing greater
limitations on Congress’s ability to abrogate through their
broad interpretation of the language of the Eleventh
Amendment. Congress then had to rewrite the legislation,
only for the Court to turn around and find that the
Constitution required even greater limitations be placed on
Congressional authority to abrogate. Hence, the Supreme
Court and Congress are more or less passing the ball back
and forth between each other when it comes to abrogation of
state immunity. In the context of trademarks, this is the game
that has been played between Congress and the Supreme
Court since the enactment of the Lanham Act.
Section IV evaluates whether the new limitations placed
on Congress’s ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity
through legislation invalidates the TRCA’s attempt to
abrogate. The Court has already struck down Congress’s
attempt to subject states to suit in federal court for false
advertising claims brought pursuant to the TRCA. However,
the Court left open the question of whether Congress’s
attempt to subject states to suit in federal court for trademark
infringement claims brought under the TRCA is a valid
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. In this section I
examine the TRCA’s validity when it comes to trademark
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infringement claims to determine if it can pass the vigorous
test set out by the Court in such cases as Seminole Tribe v.
Florida 3 and City of Boerne v. Flores 4 . Those two cases
provide an analytical framework by which all legislative
attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity must be
evaluated.
In Seminole Tribe, the Court established that there are two
requirements that need to be met for legislation to validly
abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. First,
Congressional intent to abrogate state immunity must be clear
in the language of the legislation.5 Second, Congress must be
enacting the legislation pursuant to a constitutional provision
that grants it the authority to do so. 6 Currently, the only
constitutional authority recognized by the Supreme Court for
Congress’s enactment of abrogating legislation is section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In determining whether
Congress had the authority to act pursuant to its section 5
powers, the legislation must then be evaluated under a threefactor test set forth in City of Boerne.7 In this final section of
the comment I will go through each of the three factors
individually to determine whether the TRCA meets the
requirements of that test.
The first factor analyzes whether the interests sought to
be protected by the statute are interests which are protected
by the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. I
submit that the interests protected by the infringement
provisions of the Lanham Act are interests that qualify as
“property” for purposes of the Due Process Clause. However,
just because there is a constitutional right at issue, does not
answer the question of whether there has been a due process
violation. The TRCA also has to be preventative or remedial
in nature, which is the second factor of the test. I suggest that
in the case of a trademark infringement suit, the Court would
not find the legislation to be remedial or preventative in
3

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
6
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
7
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
4
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nature because the record does not indicate any pattern or
history of trademark infringement by the states or mention
whether the states provide adequate remedies for such
violations. I argue that by requiring Congress to provide such
a record of violations it is ignoring the fact that a record
cannot be established unless law suits are being brought, and
few people are going to waste time and money bringing a suit
against a state in light of the Supreme Court’s sovereign
immunity jurisprudence. This requirement thus backs
Congress into a corner from which it can never escape.
Before the Court can conclude that there has been no pattern
or history of trademark violations by the state, it has to first
give individuals the opportunity to bring such suits against
the state. Unfortunately, for lack of this record, the Court
would probably come to the same conclusion that it did when
it examined the validity of the Patent Remedy Clarification
Act, which is that because there is no pattern or history of
constitutional violations, there is no congruence or
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means to that end, which is the final factor
of the test. Therefore, if the Court were to evaluate the
constitutional validity of the TRCA’s attempt to abrogate
state sovereign immunity and subject states to suit in federal
court for trademark infringement, the attempt would probably
be ruled unconstitutional.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not
to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent. This is the general sense,
and the general practice of mankind; and the
exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the
government of every State in the Union.
Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will
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remain with the States . . .” 8
Alexander Hamilton’s fears of federal government
overreaching were expressed in the Federalist Papers.9 These
historic articles illustrate the tensions between state and
federal government that have plagued our nation since its
formation. The problem still exists because there is a very
fine line between the protection of individual rights and state
sovereign immunity, and it becomes difficult to balance these
interests. On one hand, the concept of state sovereignty has
become a central tenet of federalism.10 On the other hand, one
of the federal government’s historic roles has been to protect
against the infringement of individual rights. The Eleventh
Amendment immunizes states from suits in federal court, but
the states are granted this independence at the expense of the
federal government’s ability to enforce basic federal rights.11
When a state impinges upon an individual’s constitutionally
protected rights, enforcement of those rights by the federal
government could threaten the sovereign immunity of the
state.12 This is why it is crucial in our federalist system of
government to find how to properly balance the power
between state and federal governments.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has ruled unfavorably
towards Congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. 13 For instance, the Court found that a statute
allowing an individual to sue a state for monetary damages
for violation of an age discrimination law unconstitutional.14

8

The Federalist Papers No. 81, at 487–88 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
9
See Id.
10
Id. at 390.
11
See Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 394 (4d ed.
2003).
12
See Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 388 (3d ed.
1999).
13
Starting with Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and extending
through Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) and Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
14 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66−67.
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The Court has ruled similarly in intellectual property cases.15
Based on these holdings, it seems that the Court is following
the line of jurisprudence originally laid out in the early case
Hans v. Louisiana.16 In that case, the Court held that a citizen
could not sue his own state in federal court, thereby
construing the Eleventh Amendment beyond its plain
meaning. 17 The Eleventh Amendment reads: “[t]he judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 18 If the Court
were to follow a textual approach in interpreting this
amendment then not only would a citizen be able to bring a
suit against his own state in federal court, but there would be
greater flexibility for Congress to validly abrogate state
sovereign immunity in other contexts. However, based on the
broad construction the Court gives this amendment, the states
have expansive protection from suits against them in federal
court, arguably beyond the original intent of Congress.
A. The Ratification of the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted in response to
Chisholm v. Georgia.19 In that case, a South Carolina citizen
sued the state of Georgia to collect on a debt that Georgia had
accrued during the Revolutionary War. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear that case based on the Judiciary Act
of 1789 which gave it original jurisdiction over suits between
a state and a citizen of another state.20 The authority for that
act was derived from Article III, section 2, of the Constitution.
Edmund Randolph, an opponent of state immunity during the
state ratification conventions, represented Chisholm in the
15

See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
16
Hans, 134 U.S. 1.
17
Id. at 18−21.
18
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
19
Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419.
20
The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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suit. The state of Georgia declined to appear, claiming that it
was not subject to the suit because it had not waived its
immunity. 21 The case seemed to revive the old issues and
tensions that arose during the state ratification conventions.
These issues, over whether the text of Article III subjects
states to suit in federal court, and also whether states should
be immune from such suits, was never resolved at that time.
Many had opposed ratification of the Constitution because
they did not believe states should be brought into the federal
courts as defendants.22 The reason for these strong opinions
was probably due to the fact that the states had accumulated
large debts during the Revolutionary War, and there was fear
that they would be dragged into the federal courts to account
for these debts. This fear became a reality in Chisholm, and
when the Court held that a citizen of one state could sue
another state in federal court, the states reacted with
hostility. 23 This prompted Congress’s proposal of the
Eleventh Amendment one month later, and the states’
subsequent ratification, thereby preventing further suits
against states by citizens of another state in federal court.24
Congress’s quick response shows how important sovereign
immunity was to the founders. That hostility towards
subjecting states to suit seems to have resonated with the
Court until the present day, and may be the reason for the
Court’s continued expansion of the Eleventh Amendment’s
meaning.
B. Limitations on the Broad Scope of State
Sovereign Immunity
Despite the narrow text of the amendment, the Court has
continued to broaden its scope ever since the 1800’s25 when
21

See Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, note 14 at 399, 400, 401
(3d ed. 1999).
22
The Debates in the Several States Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution, 526−527 (Johnathan Elliot ed. 1937).
23
Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419−21.
24
Hans v. State of Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
25
See Id.; In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (holding that
states were immune from suits in admiralty); Principality of Monaco v.
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the Hans Court set forth the basic premise that the Eleventh
Amendment presumes that states are sovereign entities that
cannot be sued in federal court without their consent.26 In a
century’s worth of cases reaffirming this broad principle,
relief for private citizens with grievance against a state came
in the form of the 1908 decision Ex Parte Young.27 Ex Parte
Young opened the door to remedies for citizens who were
harmed by a state action.28 The Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment does not prohibit suits against state officers in
federal court for injunctive relief. 29 However, it is
questionable whether this alternative is adequate for
intellectual property owners whose preference would likely
be monetary relief. In 1976, the Court carved out another
exception to state sovereign immunity when it held that
Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity through
legislation.30 In the case Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held
that Congress could validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity when acting pursuant to the power granted to it in
the Fourteenth Amendment.31 This clause grants Congress the
authority to enforce the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation”. 32
The Court also recognized the ability of Congress to abrogate
state immunity when acting pursuant to its Article I powers
although that decision would not survive more than sixteen
years.33

State of Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)(holding that states were
immune from suits brought by foreign governments).
26
Hans, 134 U.S. at 13.
27
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
28
Id. at 159.
29
Id.
30
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
31
Id.
32
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §5.
33
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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II. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS LIMITING
CONGRESS’S ABILITY TO ABROGATE STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BY LEGISLATION
A. The Establishment of a Two-prong Test under
which All Legislative Attempts to Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity Must be Evaluated
The Rehnquist Court retracted from the exceptions to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity that the Court had earlier set
forth, thereby slowly shifting the balance more in the states’
favor. 34 From these cases a two-prong test has emerged in
which the validity of a statute that attempts to abrogate state
sovereign immunity is evaluated.35
Under the first prong, Congress must unequivocally
express its intent to abrogate the state’s immunity. 36 This
prong requires Congress to write the statute in such a way
that its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity is
unmistakably clear. 37 This “clear expression” prong was
derived from the 1985 case, Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon.38
The second prong requires that Congress act pursuant to a
valid exercise of power.39 For the statute in question to satisfy
this prong Congress must be acting pursuant to a
constitutional provision which grants it power so to act.40 The
Court in Seminole Tribe held that Congress cannot validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I of the
Constitution. In that historic case, the Supreme Court
significantly altered the concept of state sovereign immunity.
Prior to this decision, the Court, in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Company, had explicitly upheld Congress’s ability to
34

See Id; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
35
See Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F.Supp.2d 218
(2000).
36
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 55 (1996).
37
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
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abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.41 The result in Seminole Tribe was that Congress is
no longer able to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant
to the Commerce Clause or any other Article I power.42
B. Why the Enforcement Clause is the Only
Constitutional Means by Which Congress Can
Legislatively Abrogate State Sovereign
Immunity
The Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from state
deprivations and imposes due process requirements on states.
Congress, therefore, has the authority under this section to
create legislation that allows citizens to sue the state for
deprivations that rise to the level of a taking without the due
process of law.43 One of the reasons why the Court decided to
allow Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
when acting pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, but not
Article I, is because the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted
long after the Eleventh Amendment, as opposed to the
Eleventh Amendment, which was enacted after the
ratification of Article I. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment
actually trumps Article I, but the Fourteenth Amendment
trumps the Eleventh. 44 The Court reasoned that since the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted well after the Eleventh
Amendment, is clear that the intent was for the Fourteenth
Amendment to alter the pre-existing balance of power
between state and federal government.45

41

Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 at 66 (1996) (overruling
Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1).
43
See Alden v. Maine 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
44
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44.
45
Id.
42

60

Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property

Vol. 3

C. Additional Requirements Set Forth by the
Supreme Court that Affect Congress’s Ability to
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity Through
Legislation
In addition to the changes made by Seminole Tribe, City
of Boerne also had a significant impact on federalism.46 This
case built upon the concept already stated in Seminole Tribe,
that Congress can only abrogate through “appropriate
legislation.” In City of Boerne the Court narrowed the
instances where Congress could appropriately pass legislation
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 It is
clear from City of Boerne that Congress may only act under
section 5 to remedy or prevent an action that violates the
Constitution.48 In addition, to be “appropriate legislation”, the
remedies provided must be tailored in a way that is
reasonably proportionate to the violation that Congress is
seeking to remedy or prevent.49
When determining whether a legislative measure that
subjects states to suits in federal court is appropriate
legislation, it must pass the restrictive test laid out in City of
Boerne. To pass this test, a set of factors must be considered,
starting with defining the scope of the constitutional right
sought to be protected.50 Once the right has been identified,
Congress must show a history and pattern of state
deprivations or infringements of that right. 51 Finally, the
remedies made available in the statute must be proportionate
to the identified pattern of violations.52 If the statute cannot
meet the rigors of this test, then Congress will have exceeded
the scope of its enforcement powers, and the legislation will
be deemed an invalid attempt to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
46

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 520.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
51
Id.
52
Id.
47
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D. The Effects of Seminole Tribe and City of
Boerne on Intellectual Property Cases
The Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne decisions
materially restricted Congress’s ability to abrogate states’
sovereign immunity, and the impact of these decisions on
intellectual property can clearly be seen in the cases which
followed.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank53(hereinafter Florida
Prepaid) and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board 54 (hereinafter
College Savings Bank) illustrate how the prior Supreme
Court cases have curtailed private persons ability to sue a
state in federal court. In Florida Prepaid, a private bank,
College Savings Bank, received a patent on its unique type of
college savings account. 55 The state of Florida put out a
similar payment program for college accounts, and the
private bank brought a patent infringement suit against the
state under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act).56 The Patent Remedy
Act subjects states, state officials, officers, and
instrumentalities to suit in federal court for patent
infringement.57 The state of Florida sought to dismiss the suit
claiming the Act did not validly abrogate state immunity
because Congress did not have the constitutional authority to
do so.58 When the issue reached the Supreme Court, the Court
used the two-prong test to determine if the state could be
subjected to suit.59 The Court found that the first prong of the
test was easily met because Congress had made its intent to
subject states to suit in federal court “unmistakably clear in

53

Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
54
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
55
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630−31.
56
Id. at 632−33.
57
35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(f).
58
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633.
59
Id. at 635.
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the language of the statute.”60 Therefore, the Court was left to
determine if the Act could meet the second prong of the test,
which requires Congress to have the constitutional authority
to pass it.61 Congress had stated three sources of authority for
the Act: the Patent Clause, the Commerce Clause, and section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 When the Act was passed
in 1992, Congress still had the authority to abrogate pursuant
to its Article I powers.63 However, the Court noted that the
Act could no longer be justified under either the Patent
Clause or Commerce Clause, and could only be upheld if it
were “appropriate legislation” pursuant to section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 64 The analytical framework
established in City of Boerne was used to determine if this
was in fact “appropriate legislation.” 65 Under this analysis,
the Court first asked whether the Act was seeking to remedy
or prevent state violations of Fourteenth Amendment
protections. 66 The violation that the Act was seeking to
remedy was identified as “unremedied patent infringement by
the States.” 67 Therefore, the Act was remedial in nature,
however, the Act was not able to pass the final factor of the
City of Boerne test, which requires congruence and
proportionality between the Fourteenth Amendment
protections afforded to patent owners and the remedies
provided for those violations.68 Although Congress provided
a few examples of patent infringement suits brought against
the states, the Court found this evidence inadequate because it
did not establish a pattern. 69 The Court reasoned that the
remedy was, therefore, not in proportion to the harm.70 The
Court noted that the Act might have survived if it had
60

Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 at 242 (1985).
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 55 (1996).
62
S. Rep. 102-280, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3093-94.
63
See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
64
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637−38 (1999).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 639.
67
Id. at 640.
68
Id. at 646−47.
69
Id. at 640.
70
Id. at 646−47.
61
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provided a remedy for specific patent violations, such as
intentional infringement by the state of a citizen’s patent.71
Therefore, the Patent Remedy Act was held invalid due to the
narrow standards set forth in City of Boerne. This case also
shows the effects that Seminole Tribe has had on
Congressional ability to validly abrogate state sovereign
immunity by legislation. In holding that Congress no longer
has constitutional authority to abrogate under its Article I
powers, Congress only has one avenue of authority to justify
its actions. Furthermore, this case illustrates the tremendous
difficulty that Congress will continue to have in trying to
enact “appropriate legislation” pursuant to the confined City
of Boerne test. This case will have lasting effects on patent
owners whose patents are infringed by a state. By
immunizing states from suit in federal court for patent
infringement, the Court has effectively left states
unaccountable for these violations in federal court.
Effectively, the only option of the patent owner is to bring an
injunction action pursuant to Ex Parte Young where money
damages would not be available.
Similar ramifications of the major Rehnquist Court
decisions affecting sovereign immunity can be seen in
College Savings Bank, the companion case of Florida
Prepaid. This case put into issue the validity of the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act’s72 (TRCA) attempt to
permit suit against a state for false advertising claims that it
made about its own product.73 The state of Florida challenged
Congress’s attempt at abrogation, arguing that the Act was
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which is no longer
grants Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. 74 College Savings Bank defended the validity of
the Act, arguing that Congress also acted pursuant to section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when enacting the
71

Id.
Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C., §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (2000)).
73
College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 668, 669 (1999).
74
Id. at 671–72.
72
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legislation. 75 The Court first determined whether the Act
could cross the initial hurdle laid out in Seminole Tribe,
which requires it be passed in order to enforce a right
protected in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. College
Savings Bank asserted that the Act was enacted to enforce the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
sought “to remedy and prevent” state deprivation of two
property rights: “(1) a right to be free from a business
competitor’s false advertising about its own product, and (2)
a more generalized right to be secure in one’s business
interest.”76 The Court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument,
and found that the false advertising provision of the Lanham
Act did not grant any “property” interest in the traditional
sense of the word.77 Traditionally, the Court noted, a property
right exists where there is a right to exclude. 78 The Court
reasoned that when a claim is brought against someone for
the misrepresentations that it made about its own product, this
does not confer on the claimant any right to exclude. 79 In
other words, the “activity of doing business” is not property
for purposes of the Due Process Clause.80
From these cases, one can conclude that if the Court
reviews the TRCA’s attempt to subject states to suits in
federal court for trademark infringement, it will go through
the same analytical framework that it did in College Savings
and Florida Prepaid.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF
THE TRADEMARK REMEDY CLARIFICATION ACT’S
ATTEMPT TO SUBJECT STATES TO SUITS IN
FEDERAL COURT FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act is the federal trademark statute whose
main purpose is to protect consumers from confusion as to
75
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the source of goods and services, and it provides civil liability
for those who cause such confusion. 81 Such liability,
according to the Act, can be imposed upon “[a]ny person.”82
“Person” is defined in section 45 of the Act to include a
“juristic person” which is a broad category covering “a firm,
corporation, union, association, other organization capable of
suing and being sued in a court of law.”83 Congress passed
the TRCA in 1992 to clarify that it was Congress’s intent that
states not be immune from suits brought under the Lanham
Act, thereby expressly abrogating state sovereign immunity.84
The TRCA amended the definition of “person” to include
“any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his
or her official capacity.”85
The express abrogation language in the TRCA arose in
response to a line of cases beginning with Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon. 86 In Atascadero the issue before the
Court was whether, under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a
citizen could bring a suit against a state in federal court where
he was seeking retroactive monetary relief under the Act.87
The Court found that such suits against states in federal court
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the Act did
not clearly and unequivocally express Congress’s intent to
abrogation states’ sovereign immunity. 88 Based on that
holding, Congress could validly abrogate states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity so long as it made its intent clear in
the language of the statute. The Federal Circuit followed this
premise when it decided Chew v. California.89 In that case,
the court found that states were immune from suits brought in
federal court for patent infringement because the amendments
to the Patent Act did not contain a clear expression of
81
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Congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.90
Following these cases, Congress amended the Lanham Act
and the Patent Act to make its intent clear. It did so under the
authority of Union Gas Company, which held that sovereign
immunity is a judicially created doctrine, which Congress
may supersede by a clear expression of its intent to do so.91 In
order to fulfill the “clear statement” requirement, the TRCA
amended the Lanham Act by providing that states “shall not
be immune, under the eleventh amendment . . . from suit in
federal court by any person . . . for any violation of this
Act . . . ”92 Thus, the TRCA clearly subjects states to suits
brought under sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act for
federal and state trademark infringement.
Trademarks are protected under state and federal law,
which operate concurrently. The federal law that governs
trademarks is the Lanham Act. 93 The Lanham Act codifies
common law protection for trademark rights and provides
protection for those rights at the federal level.94 This means
that the Act protects both federally registered and
unregistered marks against another person’s use of a
confusingly similar mark in commerce.95 Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act provides a federal cause of action against any
one who uses a mark in connection with any goods or
services in interstate commerce that is likely to cause
confusion, mistake, or to deceive.96 Section 32 provides the
same protection to the owners of federally registered marks.97
Turning to the two-prong test, the TRCA easily passes the
first prong by expressly stating its abrogation intent.
Therefore, the real issue, when it comes to attempts to bring a
suit against a state in federal court for violations of sections
90
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32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, is whether Congress had the
constitutional authority to subject states to such suit in federal
court for money damages. Congress rested its authority for
the abrogation on the powers given to it in Article I,
specifically the Commerce Clause, and its power to enforce
the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 98
The Lanham Act itself was derived from the Commerce
Clause. 99 Of course, it was not until 1996 that the Court
overruled Union Gas Company in Seminole Tribe. 100
Therefore, under the precedent established in Seminole Tribe,
Article I powers cannot be the sole basis for abrogation. This
means that the TRCA can only subject states to suit in federal
court if it is “appropriate legislation” under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne has defined
“appropriate legislation” as legislation that seeks to remedy
or prevent violations of a substantive provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and does so in a way in which the
remedy is in proportion to the harm or injury.101
In order to fulfill the “appropriate legislation” test set
forth in City of Boerne three factors must be met. First, there
must be a constitutional right at issue that is protected by
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 provides,
in relevant part: “. . . nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”
Accordingly, the TRCA must be seeking to protect either a
life, liberty, or property right for purposes of the due process
clause to be meet this initial hurdle. In the context of
trademarks, the only section 1 right that could apply is the
right of property. Therefore, a trademark must be deemed
“property” for purposes of the due process clause or Congress
will not have the authority to protect it under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Second, under the City of Boerne “appropriate
legislation” test, the TRCA must seek to remedy or prevent
state violations of the constitutional right of property. To do
98
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so, there must be evidence of a pattern of trademark
infringement by the states or evidence that the states do not
provide adequate state remedies to those who fall victim of
such infringement. Finally, even if a pattern of trademark
infringement by the states is found, there must be
“congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”102
A. Is a Trademark “Property” for Purposes of the
Due Process Clause?
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress
the power to enforce the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.103 The due process clause is violated when there
is a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.104 When assessing the validity of the TRCA,
the interests that the Lanham Act’s trademark infringement
provisions seek to protect must be found to be the type of
“property” interest which is protected by the due process
clause. If there are no property rights which are protected by
the due process clause, then Congress has no constitutional
authority to abrogate.
As already noted, in College Savings Bank the Court
found Congress’s attempt to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under section 43(a)(1)(A) unconstitutional when it
comes to false advertising claims where the misleading
statement is about the defendant’s own product. The Court
concluded that Congress lacked authority to abrogate
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because
the interests protected by the false advertising claim did not
amount to a property right which is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 105 This was because the false
advertising claim did not give its owner any right to
exclude. 106 On the other hand, the Court noted that “[t]he
102
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Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect
constitutionally cognizable property interests--notably, its
provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks, which
are the ‘property’ of the owner because he can exclude others
from using them.”107 Where the former is not protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the latter is. The Court’s decision in
College Savings leaves open the question of what rights
embodied in the Lanham Act could be characterized as
constitutionally protected property that are subject to section
5 legislation.
The owner of property is traditionally given the right to
restrict and grant access to her property: in other words, the
owner of property has the exclusive rights of control and
possession of that property.108 For instance, when it comes
to real property, an owner has the right exclude others from
entering the property.109 Intellectual property rights provide
their owners with the same rights to exclude as real property
owners. Patent owners, for example, are granted the exclusive
right to make, use, or sell their patented design, products,
processes, etc. 110 Unlike traditional forms of property, a
trademark is created by the mental impression it gives its
customers.111 Since the value of the trademark is created by
mental association the mark makes in the minds of its
consumers,112 when a third person uses the same or
confusingly similar mark, the association that has been built
up in the consumer’s minds can begin to deteriorate. 113
Therefore, the property interest protected by the trademark is
not the trademark itself but rather the mental association, and
the owner has a right to protect that mental association from
deteriorating. If confusion is likely to occur in the minds of
the consumer due to a third party’s actions (use in a similar
107
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market of the same or similar mark), then those actions can
be prohibited by the mark owner because he has a right to
exclude such harmful uses which affect the mental
association that has been built up in the mark.
The difference between trademarks and patents is pretty
clear. The latter gives its owner a right to prohibit another
from making use of her invention or original fixed work,
whereas the former gives its owner an exclusive right to use
the mark as a brand identifier. The Court in Florida Prepaid
recognized patents as a form of property that requires
constitutional protection.114 When a state intentionally
infringes a patent, the owner is deprived of a property interest
of the type protected by the due process clause. 115 To
determine if a patent is property under the Fourteenth
Amendment the Court looked at how patents have
traditionally been viewed by courts. 116 They noted that
patents “have long been considered a species of property.”117
We can conclude based on the Court’s analysis in Florida
Prepaid, that the Court will place great weight on how the
interest in question has been treated by courts in the past, and
whether there are any recognizable traits of that interest that
can be reconciled with the traditional rights given to property
owners.
The Court has recognized that, “[t]rademark law. . .
confers private rights, which are themselves rights of
exclusion.” 118 The trademark owner’s right to exclude is
illustrated by the Court’s treatment of the term “Olympic.” In
1987, the Court upheld Congress’s legislation giving the
United Sates Olympic Committee exclusive rights to use the
term “Olympic.”119 In the case before the Court, the Court
found that the term “Olympic” was the property of the
Committee, and so it could exclude others from using it
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without their permission.120 Although, there is an important
distinction between an infringement suit brought by most
trademark owners and one initiated by the Olympic
Committee, because the latter’s right to exclude was created
by statute, but this does not mean that other trademark
owners do not have a similar right to exclude. Rather, the
trademark owner just has a narrower right to exclude. He may
only prevent others from using a mark which is confusingly
similar to his and is sold in the same or similar market. The
Olympic Committee can prevent anyone from using the mark
irrespective of confusing similarity of the marks. This
distinction is insignificant; either way a trademark owner has
some rights to exclude. The only one who has the right to
prevent consumer confusion is the owner of the trademark.
This is the trademark owner’s exclusive right because
consumers who are confused over similar marks do not have
a right to bring suit under the Lanham Act.121
College Savings Bank suggests that two things are needed
for claims under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to be
considered property. First, the claim must implicate the
public’s right not to be confused and, second, the plaintiff’s
right to control the reputation of his product. These are the
two interests that the courts have recognized as property.122
Both of these rights would be implicated in a trademark
infringement suit. Not only is there a risk of consumer
confusion, but also a risk that the good will plaintiff has built
up for his product will be diminished or destroyed. As stated
by the Second Circuit, “[t]he owner of the mark acquires the
right to prevent the goods to which the mark is applied from
being confused with those of others and to prevent his own
trade from being diverted to competitors through their use of
misleading marks.” 123 It would seem to follow that if an
120
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individual trademark owner brought suit against a state for
trademark infringement, then the owner of the mark would be
able to meet the first hurdle of the City of Boerne test because
the interests that the TRCA seeks to protect in an
infringement suit are property interests that qualify for
protection under the due process clause.
B. Is There Any Pattern or History of
Constitutional Violations that Congress was
Seeking to Remedy or Prevent?
If the Act passes the threshold questions of whether
Congress has identified a violation of a substantive provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must next determine
if the provisions of the Act are remedial or preventative in
nature.124 According to Justice Scalia, “as a logical matter . . .
not everything which protects property interests is designed
to remedy or prevent deprivations of those property
interests.”125 The Court never reached this issue in College
Savings Bank, because in the false advertising issue before
the Court, there was no property interest that could be
protected by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, so the
Act was not able to pass the initial hurdle of the City of
Boerne test. However, from the opinion in Florida Prepaid,
we can conclude that the Court requires Congress to identify
a pattern or history of state violations which it is seeking to
remedy or prevent in the record.126 This logic stems from City
of Boerne, which held that in order for Congress to rectify
constitutional violations, it must establish a record. 127 And,
even if these violations are identified, they have to amount to
violations of a constitutionally protected right. 128 Which
means that the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
property interest is not enough for the Fourteenth
Amendment to kick in; there must also be a denial of due
124
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process of law that Congress seeks to redress.129 Below, the
TRCA will be evaluated to determine if it identifies any
pattern or history of trademark infringement by the states, and
also whether the state remedies available for such
infringements meet the adequacy test.
In turning to the first question, did Congress identify a
pattern or history of state constitutional violations in
trademark cases, the identified violations must amount to
more than a few instances of state constitutional violations,
and the identified violations must be actual, not hypothetical
or theoretical. Neither the Patent Remedy Clarification Act
nor the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act were able to
illustrate such a pattern of infringement that the courts were
looking for.130 For instance, in Chavez, the court found that
the few instances of state copyright infringement did not
amount to a pattern.131 At the House Hearings for the Patent
Remedy Act it was admitted that the legislation was passed as
a “philosophical matter”. 132 The legislative record for the
TRCA does not specifically state any actual incidents of state
intellectual property violations, and the Senate Report does
not give even one example of trademark infringements by the
states. The only evidence that could be presented to the Court
is a study conducted by the General Accounting Office
(GAO). This study found that a state has been sued in state
and federals court for intellectual property violations only
fifty-eight times since 1985. 133 This number of violations
covering all types of intellectual property over a course of
fifteen years would probably not amount to a pattern in the
Court’s eyes sufficient to support the validity of the TRCA’s
129
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attempt to subject states to suit in federal court for trademark
infringement. However, one might question whether this
showing of a pattern or history of trademark infringements by
the state could ever be proven. It is possible that there are
more instances of trademark infringement by states occurring
yet the studies would not capture such a pattern because they
are only looking towards actual suits being brought against
the states for these violations. However, one might argue that
a prudent attorney would not bring a suit against a state for
such violations due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. A
similar issue was identified by Mr. James Rogan, Director of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, in noting that
the GAO study might be flawed due to the fact that state
universities and state attorney generals often handle
infringement accusations by administrative procedures, and
so those accusations would be unaccounted for. 134 This is
probably something the Court should take into account when
considering this factor of the test.
As the TRCA now stands, there is clearly an absence of
any “record” of trademark infringement by the states. In
addition, even if the Court did look past the four corners of
the record, there still is a lack of evidence of any pattern or
history of these violations. Congress cannot seek to remedy a
violation that does not exist. Therefore, the Court would
probably find that the TRCA, although intended to remedy
and prevent state violations under the Lanham Act, does not
actually remedy or prevent anything, because no such
violations exist. However, if the Court were to find that such
a pattern does exist, this is not the end of the inquiry. The
next question is whether there are available state remedies in
place that are adequate under the due process clause. A
deprivation of property is not enough to constitute a
constitutional violation; there must also be a denial of due
process of the law.135
134
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The Court will recognize a due process violation where a
state provides inadequate remedies to those injured by its
conduct. 136 In Florida Prepaid the Court followed this
reasoning when it held there to be no constitutional violation
if a state has provided adequate remedies to those it has
harmed. 137 They found that when it comes to state patent
infringement cases, a state only violates the due process
clause where the state does not provide an adequate remedy
to the affected patent holders.138 One of the reasons that the
Patent Remedy Act failed in Florida Prepaid was because
Congress did not fully discuss state remedies available to
patent owners.139 Also, the Senate Report did not make any
mention of what state remedies were available for patent
violations, and the House Report only discussed a few. 140
Some examples of remedies that states may have in place
include: a general waiver of sovereign immunity for suits
brought in state court for those harmed to recover damages in
tort,141 inverse condemnation actions against the state for just
compensation, 142 and common law remedies for unfair
competition torts.143
According to the legislative history, Congress adopted the
TRCA in order to, “rectify the inherent inequity plaguing the
area of trademark protection.” 144 Congress noted that state
court trademark remedies were inadequate compared to the
federal remedies available.145 However, they did not cite any
specific examples of such inadequacies. This blanket
statement, without any evidentiary support, probably would
not hold any weight with the Court when evaluating this
factor. Case law suggests that “inadequate,” for due process
136
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purposes, basically means that there are no state remedies
available for relief of the deprivation. 146 According to the
Court, there is no due process violation even if the state does
not provide all the same remedies that would be available
under the federal law. 147 In addition, there is no right to a
particular form of remedy required by the Constitution. 148
Based on these articulations, we could conclude that having
some remedy available for the injury in state court means that
there are adequate remedies under the due process clause.
Given the fact that Congress did not discuss whether there
were any remedies available at state law, nor cited any
specific reasons why the remedies that were available were
inadequate, the legislation would fail to meet the
requirements of this factor.
C. Do the Means Fit the End?
The final factor of the City of Boerne test requires there
be “proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”149 In City of
Boerne the Court held that Congress only has the authority
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
legislation that is remedial in nature, and not legislation that
would create new rights. 150 The legislation is creating new
substantive rights if there is no congruence or proportionality
between the identified harm and the means adopted to
prevent or remedy that harm.
Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce the
substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment through
prophylactic legislation.151 This means that the Enforcement
Clause gives Congress the power not only to proscribe
unconstitutional conduct, but also to create legislation that is
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aimed at remedying and/or preventing such conduct. 152
However, the Court made clear in City of Boerne that it is the
Court’s job to define constitutional rights, not Congress’s.153
Therefore, if the legislation grants greater guarantees than
those found in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then
it must be aimed at remedying or preventing identified
constitutional violations rather than expanding the definition
of the substantive guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The test for determining whether the statute is proper
prophylactic legislation or if it redefines the substantive
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, is whether there is
congruence and proportionality between the constitutional
violations sought to be remedied or prevented and the means
to meeting that end.154
The Patent Remedy Act failed under this factor because
there was no pattern or history of deprivation of the identified
harm, thus, the remedy was not in proportion to the perceived
harm.155 In other words, to the broad scope of violations that
the Act subjected states to suit in federal court was not in
proportion to the limited number of constitutional violations
in patent cases overall. This legislation went too far. Aside
from Florida Prepaid, there are other cases that have not
been able to pass this final factor. In Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents,156 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s
(ADEA) attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity was
found unconstitutional because it failed this prong of the
test.157 The Court found that Congress did not have a good
enough reason to believe that states were discriminating
against their employees on the basis of their age.158 Because
of this “lack of evidence of widespread age discrimination,”
the remedies were not in not in proportion to the harm.159 The
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) also failed the
152

Id.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–24.
154
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
155
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645–47.
156
Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
157
Id. at 82–83.
158
Id. at 91.
159
Id.
153

78

Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property

Vol. 3

congruence and proportionality test in Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett.160 The Court found that
Congress’s attempt to subject states to suit in federal court for
damages under the ADA was invalid since there was no
pattern of state discrimination that violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 161 As such, there was no congruence between
the remedy and constitutional violations. 162 These cases
suggest that any Act to be analyzed under the City of Boerne
test next is likely to fail this prong.
Legislation passed under section 5 would avoid
overbreadth if it does not extend beyond instances of
identified constitutional violations. South Carolina v.
Katzenbach 163 illustrates a prime example of perfectly
tailored remedial legislation. In that case, the constitutional
validity of certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 were in issue.164 These provisions were upheld because
they were narrowly confined to apply only to regions of the
country where the worst incidents of voting discrimination
had occurred. 165 The courts have tried to illustrate how to
tailor legislation in order to meet this factor. When a statute
has been found to be overly-broad, the courts have made
suggestions to illustrate what Congress could have done to
make the statute be constitutional. The Fifth Circuit, when
reviewing the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, suggested
that the Act would not have run afoul of the City of Boerne
restrictions if it had narrowed its scope to a specific violation,
such as allowing suits against a state if the state does not
provide adequate remedies for their infringing acts. 166 The
Court in Florida Prepaid made similar suggestions, such as
limiting the Act to intentional patent infringements by the
state. 167 These suggestions provide useful comparisons
between legislation the court will find constitutional and
160
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legislation it will strike down for going too far. If the
legislation at issue reaches cases where no due process
violations exist, then the provisions are overly broad.168
For the TRCA to be valid, the unconstitutional
deprivations of property rights in trademark infringement
cases must be in proportion to the scope of suits in which the
TRCA would abrogate state sovereign immunity. This factor
of the test goes hand in hand with the prior one. Congress
must tailor legislation so that the remedy directly responds to
the identified pattern or history of constitutional violations.
The legislation would fail this prong automatically if there is
no such pattern. In effect, Congress is creating a new remedy
for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is exactly
what City of Boerne prohibits. In City of Boerne, the Court
examined the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
which was enacted to limit the government’s ability to
interfere with certain religious practices.169 In that case, even
though the RFCA remedied some constitutional violations, its
scope reached beyond the religious practices covered by the
Constitution and, therefore, did not meet the congruence and
proportionality test. 170 This shows that even if the TRCA
remedies some constitutional violations, such as intentional
trademark infringements, it would still be deemed invalid
legislation because its scope goes beyond those instances, and
applies to all Lanham Act violations.
The language of the TRCA should be confined to
abrogate state immunity only in cases where there is an actual
deprivation of property without due process of law. As it is
currently written, the TRCA abrogates immunity in all
trademark cases, which goes beyond what is necessary to
enforce the provisions of the due process clause. If the
validity of the TRCA were examined again, this time in the
case of a trademark infringement claim rather than a false
advertising claim, the Court would probably come to the
same conclusion that it did in Florida Prepaid, that Congress
168
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has exceeded its section 5 authority.
To be deemed valid, the TRCA would have to be
narrowly tailored to apply only to certain types of trademark
infringement cases or provide for suits only against states that
have inadequate remedies or a high incident of infringement.
The TRCA subjects all states to suit in federal court even
though the legislative record does not point to any state
violations which it is seeking to remedy or prevent. For this
reason, the Act is overly-broad and not narrowly tailored to
the harm. There is no congruence or proportionality between
the injury Congress was trying to remedy and the means
adopted to that end, therefore, the TRCA would not pass this
final prong of the City of Boerne test.
V. CONCLUSION
There are two things that can be learned from this paper.
First, the analytical framework developed by the Court in
City of Boerne is a stringent test that has considerably
narrowed Congress’s ability to abrogate state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity through legislation. Second, only half
of the battle was won when Congress enacted the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act. Although it met the new
requirements the Court placed on legislative efforts in
Atascadero, it is not able to meet the requirements that were
later set forth in Seminole Tribe. The Rehnquist Court’s
holdings indicate the Court’s active pursuit of state’s rights.
These decisions have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
very narrowly. Under this line of reasoning the TRCA would
fail again if it were to be evaluated.
The United States government is structured in such a way
so that power is divided up between the state and federal
government. 171 However, there are times when these two
powers collide, and the Court is left to decipher how to
balance these powers. It seems obvious that the Court would
attempt to place the balance of power as close to the center as
possible. However, the Court’s holdings in cases dealing with
state sovereign immunity have largely been tipped in the
171
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states’ favor. This is evident not only in recent cases, but
from early on the Court has broadly construed the language
of the Eleventh Amendment, thus giving states the upper
hand. 172 However, after City of Boerne, it is clear that the
balance of power is now farther to the state side than ever
before. In trying to keep with the City of Boerne rationale, the
Court has, in effect, narrowed the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.173
The effect of the broad reading of the Eleventh
Amendment, and narrow reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is that Congress is left with little ability to
abrogate state sovereign immunity without being accused of
substantively redefining the Fourteenth Amendment. 174 The
real effects of these holdings are seen when they are applied
to a specific legislative attempt to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. When it comes to the TRCA, the effects are clear.
Even a legislative effort that seeks to protect a federally
protected interest against state government infringement
cannot survive the City of Boerne test.
A trademark owner is given the right to exclude another’s
use of a confusingly similar mark that would cause the mental
association that it has built up in its customers’ minds to
deteriorate. This right would probably qualify as a property
right under the due process clause. Possibly the analysis
should end there, but it does not. The TRCA would fail in the
same way that the Patent Remedy Act failed when it came to
patent infringement suits−because the legislative record lacks
enough evidence of state infringements to qualify as a pattern
or history.175 As I suggested earlier, this fatal flaw might not
be because such violations are non-existent, but because these
violations are just not reported and because trademark owners
are not willing to bring suits against a state given the Court’s
current sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Since there are not
172
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any identified violations in the record, the remedy is seen as
disproportionate because one cannot remedy where there is
no violation. That being said, if a state was sued in federal
court for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, the
case would probably be dismissed and the TRCA’s attempt to
abrogate in this area would be struck down in the same way it
was struck down in College Savings Bank.

